As the most efficient market with a mitigation instrument basis, carbon tax is highly recommended by economists and international organizations. This paper examines the impact of implementing carbon tax policy on value of change in GDP, GDP Quantity Index, Government Household Demand, Private Household Demand, and CO2 emission effects in Indonesia by using the dynamic energy Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. This study used GTAP-E that was part of GTAP 9 in 2011. GTAP-E consists of 140 countries and 57 sectors aggregated into eleven regions and eight sectors. There were three scenarios of carbon tax used in this paper that were China, Singapore, and India.
The Kyoto Protocol and the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change are two of climates policies in the world (Wesseh et al., 2017) . The climates policies still have a debate about procedures of greenhouse gas (CHG) abatement. Controversy still hangs over a specific abatement mechanism. Perman (2003) reveals that institutional approaches to facilitate internationalization of externalities and command, control instruments, and economic incentive (market-based) instruments are the instruments available for pollution control. Furthermore, Wei (2014) suggest that the price-based, quantity-based, and command-and-control mechanisms are three popular procedures of abatement. Nordhaus (2014) recommends that the government should use the price-based and quantity-based mechanisms as a tool to reduce GHG. Perman (2003) suggests that command and control provide advantages enabling polluters to be flexible in reducing pollution, but it may not always be feasible or desirable on other grounds for establishing regulations in such ways. Quantity-based mechanism is a mechanism to reduce highly redundant costs. Polluters will buy permits in that the total emissions will be equal to the total emissions generated so that only the lowest cost reductions will be made (Perman, 111 2003 and Wei, 2014) . The most attractive mechanism is the price-based mechanism, i.e. taxes such as the carbon tax where the payments are made per unit of CO2 emissions produced (Wei, 2014; Calderón et al., 2016; Lin & Li, 2011; Wesseh et al., 2017) . A carbon tax means that controlling carbon price can directly decrease the level of emissions. Nordhaus (2014) and Pizer (2002) reveal that price and quantity controls have different treatments and will lead to different welfare consequences caused by uncertainty of compliance costs. Pizer (2002) argues that price controls are more efficient. Simulations based on a stochastic computable general equilibrium model indicate that the expected welfare gained from an optimal price policy (carbon tax) is five times higher than the expected gain from the optimal quantity policy (permits). Although carbon tax is more efficient but there is still a literary debate over the most efficient mechanism (Wesseh et al., 2017) . Figure 1 illustrates the value of CO2 emissions of seven continents in 1992-2014. North America is the world's largest emitter of CO2, followed by Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Although North America's carbon emissions are the highest in the world but in 2004-2014 CO2 they decreased. Europe and Central Asia have increasing carbon emissions but they are not as high as the increasing of carbon emissions in the Middle East and North Africa continents. The interesting thing here is that from 1992-2014 the continents of East Asia and Pacific have continuously increased the CO2 emissions, even in 2011-2014 carbon emissions had plunged into the continents of Middle East and North Africa. This means that there should be special attention to the continents of East Asia and Pacific including Indonesia as one of the states from this continent.
Indonesia had the fourth largest population in the world that is 3.43% of the world population in 2016 that was very potential in causing global climate changes. Hasudungan et al. (2016) reveals that in 2000, Indonesia ranked as the fourth country with the largest total emissions as a result of land use and non-CO2 gases and ranked as the 21 th country when only CO2 emissions from fossil fuels were counted. Without these aspects, Indonesia was ranked as the fifteenth country among other top 25 countries as the largest GHG emitters in 2000. In addition, Figure 2 shows the value of CO2 emissions and GDP in 1992-2014. It can be seen that the increase of GDP from year to year is also accompanied by the increases of CO2 emissions although two years ago they had an inverse relationship. At the 21 st Conference of Parties (COP) of the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris on November 30 th to December 13 th , 2015, the President of Indonesia announced to raise its greenhouse gas emission reduction targets from 26-29% with an unconditional or no-action (Business as Usual) capability in 2030. In addition, with international supports (conditional) Indonesia is targeting to reduce emissions as much as 41% (Cabinet Secretariat of Indonesia, 2015). Indonesia makes its greatest contribution to global warming. So, it is important for both Indonesia and the world to understand the distributional impact of climate policy in Indonesia (Hasudungan et al., 2016) .
Reducing carbon emissions can be done by increasing the payment cost of "carbon tax". Carbon taxes have been widely adopted by countries in the world, such as the United States, China, India, Singapore, European Union, and Colombia Based on the above background, a carbon tax is considered to be more efficient than other policies. The CO2 emissions from the East Asia and Pacific continents increase every year including Indonesia as the fifteenth emitter in the world. Hence, this study aims to examine the impact of GDP, government household demand, private household demand, and CO2 emission reductions in Indonesia if carbon tax is applied in Indonesia. Research related to these aspects in Indonesia has been conducted by Yusuf et al. (2015) and Hasudungan et al. (2016) . The difference of this research with the previous research are that this research uses GTAP and has different simulations. In session two, the researcher explains the framework of the theory and empirical studies related to this research. The session three discusses the methodology and data used, the session four shows results and discussions, and the last session is the conclusion.
Theoretical Framework and Empirical Studies

Theoretical Framework
Perman (2003) explains that pollution tends to be an externality to the market process and as a result it is not adequately reflected in private market decisions. Considering pollution abatement, the control level that maximizes net benefits to firms is different from the level that maximizes social net benefits. Economists often recommend an economic efficiency criterion as pollution targets in a firm. This can be thought of as selecting pollution targets to maximize social net benefits. However, the economic efficiency is not only a relevant criterion for pollution target setting. Certain criteria are important to policy makers and tend to reflect their policy objectives and the constraints where they are operated (Perman, 2003) . Perman (2003) believes that to achieve the target of pollution, instruments are needed to reduce pollution. Before knowing the instruments, we must know criteria for selection of pollution control instruments. Perman (2003) suggests there are nine criteria for selection of pollution control instruments in the certainty that are cost effectiveness, long run effects, dynamic efficiency, ancillary benefits, equity, dependability, flexibility, cost of use under uncertainty, and information requirements.
But in uncertainty, criteria for selection of pollution control instruments are dependability, flexibility, cost of use under uncertainty, and information requirements.
There are three instruments of pollution control that are (Perman, 2003) :
Institutional approaches to facilitate internalization of externalities: facilitation of bargaining, specification of liability, and development of social responsibility Command and control instruments: input controls over quantity and/or mix of inputs, technology controls, output quotas or prohibitions, emissions licenses, and location controls (zoning, planning controls, relocation)
Economic incentive (market-based) instruments: emissions charges/taxes, user charges/fees/natural, resource taxes, product charges/taxes, emissions abatement and resource management subsidies, marketable (transferable marketable) emissions permits, deposit-refund systems, non-compliance fees, performance bonds, and liability payments.
In many instruments control pollution, the economic incentive (market-based) instruments are more effective in cost than command and control instruments but not all (Perman, 2003) . Figure 3 . This is the maximum net benefit available. The emissions are at any level other than M* that means the efficiency losses and thus attained net benefits fall short of their maximum level (Perman, 2003) .
The equilibrium if there are transaction cost and environmental regulation can be seen in Figure 4 (Perman, 2003) .
Figure 4. The Benefit Regulations
Source: Perman (2003) Curve D represents the marginal gross benefits of pollution abatement (the damages are avoided). The marginal, real resource costs of pollution abatement correctly are represented by the curve labelled as D. If there are no other costs, an efficient outcome will require ZA units of abatement. Indirect costs including impacts on unemployment and trade competitiveness may also be induced. Adding these to the resource abatement costs, the composite cost curve B is obtained with a correspondingly lower efficient abatement level, ZB. If the induced effects are beneficial rather than harmful, the curve B will lead to the right (rather than to the left) of curve A. Finally, the curve C adds in transactions costs to the previous two categories of costs. The efficient abatement level, taking all relevant items of information into consideration is Z. One of cost abatement is by tax or permit.
This does provide a useful way of thinking about instrument selection. The preferred instrument is the one that has a lower total cost of achieving a particular target. Even if one instrument is superior in terms of real resource cost of abatement, it does not need to be superior anymore when induced effects and transactions costs are also considered.
Literature Review
Wei (2014) suggests that the price-based mechanism, quantity-based mechanism and command-and-control mechanism are three popular procedures of abatement. Nordhaus (2014) recommends that the government should use the price-based mechanism and the quantity-based mechanism as tools to reduce GHG. Pizer (2002) argues that price controls are more efficient. Simulations based on a stochastic computable general equilibrium model indicate that the expected welfare gained from the optimal price policy (carbon tax) is five times higher than the expected gain from the optimal quantity policy (permits).
If ignoring the enviromental benefits, the developing countries' carbon taxes must be lower than the developed countries' (Wesseh et al., 2017) . His research uses GTAP version 8 by aggregating the data into six regions and ten sectors. By using some optimum stimulations of carbon taxes and testing their effects, the results introducing carbon taxes leads to both welfare and environmental gains in all regions except low-income countries especially when accrued environmental benefits. This makes carbon taxes very important for these countries. However, carbon taxes bring welfare reduction for low-income countries but at the same time reduce environmental damages in these countries as well. This result points to insights that economic growth will contribute more to welfare for low-income countries than to environmental improvements. Farzin & Tahvonen (1996) investigated how efficient environmental externalities are. The authors point out the results that imposing a carbon tax is indeed an optimal strategy of abatement. However, marginal abatement cost changes as well as changes of fossil fuel demand are very sensitive towards the marginal abatement cost changes as well as changes in the demand for fossil fuels because of the tax carbon implementation.
In line with Wesseh et al. (2017),
Besides, Zhou et al. (2011) conducted an analysis of impacts of CO2 mitigation because of carbon tax policies by using a dynamic energy environment economy CGE model. This research results that there is a negative impact on GDP from carbon tax. Carbon tax will have adverse impacts on energy production, energy intensive sectors, and household income if the carbon tax increased makes energy demand limited by increasing price signal and decreasing the CO2 emission.
The assumption that carbon and energy taxes will decrease the CO2 emissions to a proposed target is supported by Nakata & Lamont (2001) . This paper states that carbon taxes cause a shift in resources used, from coal to gas. In line with Nakata & Lamont (2001), using a different method (DID) to estimate the real mitigation effect of the five northern European countries, Lin & Li (2011) suggest that the carbon tax in Finland also has had a significant and negative impact on per capita of CO2 emission growth. Meanwhile, the impact of carbon taxes in Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands is negative but insignificant.
Li & Su (2017) analyzed the impact of different uses of carbon and BCA using the Input-output tables in Singapore and found that carbon taxes were more effective than BCA since carbon taxes reduced emissions of energy, manufacture and land transport sectors. In Indonesia, Yusuf & Resosudarmo (2015) also estimated how the carbon tax impacted by using SAM with the ORANI-G model and concluded that carbon tax had impacts on either urban or rural household income.
Based on the previous research, the researcher wanted to analyze what impacts if the carbon tax applied in Indonesia were. The difference of this research is in the tool that is GTAP E and use different scenario.
Methodology and Data
Methodology
A multiregional CGE model with focus on how variables like quotas, subsidies, and taxes interact and the dynamics through which these policy variables are connected to other indicators such as employment, income, and trade are named as the Global Trade Analysis Project or GTAP model. Nevertheless, previous studies have used GTAP for modelling the energyeconomy-environment-trade relations that is one of the important goals of the implementation of economic policy. However, the modelling of this linkage in GTAP is not yet complete. This is because the energy substitution, a key factor in this linkage chain, does not exist in the standard model specification.
Burniaux & Truong (2002) used GTAP-E to evaluate energy policy. Burniaux & Truong (2002) remedied this deficiency by incorporating energy substitution into the standard GTAP model. It was begun by reviewing some existing approaches of this problem in the contemporary CGE models. It then suggested an approach of GTAP that incorporated some of these desirable energy substitution features. The approach was implemented as an extended version of GTAP model called GTAP-E. In addition, GTAP-E incorporates carbon emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels as well as a mechanism to internationally trade these emissions.
Following the structure by Burniaux & Truong (2002) , the basic model was built. Observing the production side, energy must be taken out of the intermediate input 'nest' to be incorporated into the 'value-added' nest. The incorporation of energy into the value-added nest was conducted in two steps. Energy commodities were firstly separated into 'electricity' and 'nonelectricity' groups ( Figure 5 ). Some degrees of substitution were allowed within the non-electricity group as well as between the electricity and the non-electricity groups. 
Scenario
To analyze the impact of the carbon tax on a country's economy, it is necessary to adopt a carbon tax scenario that will be applied in a country. Application of scenarios based on the policies taken by the government, predictions, or rules applied There are still many debates about the imposition of carbon tax. The researcher states this will harm consumers and producers but it will reduce carbon emissions. The debate is due to the fact that not all countries will be ready to implement this policy. Scenario one was based on the use of Chinese carbon tax (ministry of China). Since China is the world's largest of population and the first country to apply the carbon tax in Asia, the authors assumed that this might be applicable in Indonesia because of the similarity of features. The second scenario followed the tax implications that Singapore's state (SU $10/tCO2) applies. This simulation was used because Singapore is the only ASEAN country that implements carbon tax. Indonesia applies the same amount of assumptions as neighboring countries whose aim is to reduce emissions. Finally, India implements a carbon tax of 100 rupees (US $1.06) per ton of CO2. This simulation was used by considering the facts that Indonesia and India are in the top five countries with the largest population and that they both are developing countries.
The author would see the effect change in values of GDP, GDP Quantity Index, Government and Private Household Demands for Commodity in Indonesia and CO2 emission because of carbon tax in different scenarios. Table 1 shows the impact of using the Indonesian carbon tax scenario on the change of value of GDP in the aggregated nineteen regions by observing how the percentage changes from the baseline to the new shock/equilibrium. It is observed that Indonesia itself has the greatest impact due to the implementation of carbon tax. When applying a carbon tax of US $ 20/tCO2 (SIM1), the change of value of GDP to the baseline is -0.07 meaning that the decline of GDP value is 0.07%. In the second scenario, there is a decrease in GDP by 0.02% but not as big as the implementation of the carbon tax in the scenario one. In contrast, the use of carbon taxes of US $ 1.06 (100 rupee)/tCO2 GDP makes all regions not change the GDP. In the scenario one, the impact of Indonesia's carbon tax on scenario one and two brings advantages on the GDP values of Cambodia, Laos, Philippines, Thailand, East Asia, other SE Asia, South America, North America, Latin America, Eu_25, and MENA; while Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, and MENA have a decreased value of GDP. Other regions do not change. Table 2 illustrates the impact of carbon tax on the GDP Quantity Index in nineteen regions. It appears that the change of GDP Quantity index of Indonesia has the greatest decline. The higher the tax simulation is, the greater the decrease changes. Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam and, the rest of the world have negative impacts on Indonesia's carbon tax; while Cambodia, Thailand, East Asia, South Asia, Latin America, and Eu_25 have positive impacts for scenario one. In scenario three, the impact of carbon tax of US $1.06/tCO2 on the GDP Quantity Index will only affect Indonesia with the value of -0.001%.
Result and Discussions
Result
Table 1. Impacts of Carbon Tax on Changes of Values of GDP in Nineteen Regions
Figure 6. Government Household Demand of Commodity in Indonesia
In Figure 6 , it appears that the implementation of the carbon tax at US$20/tCO2 will lead to a decrease in demand of Government Household for coal, gas, electricity, energy, and intensive industries commodities. The agriculture sector, crude oil, refined oil product, and other industries have a positive impact. However, when the carbon tax is lowered (SIM 2 and 3), the government household demand only occurs in the sectors of coal and energy intensive industries that are visible from the point where the curve is still below the zero point.
Figure 7. Private Household Demand of Commodity in Indonesia
In contrast to the Household Demand Government, the impact of carbon taxes on scenarios one, two, and three of all commodities except oil is a decrease in private household demand that is marked by a value below the zero line. In Table 3 , the total of CO2 emissions reaches -9.6%, -4.2%, and -1% under scenarios of SIM 1, SIM 2, and SIM 3, respectively in Indonesia. This indicates that the carbon tax will reduce CO2 emissions in Indonesia. CO2 emission reductions also affect Singapore (SIM 1 and 2), East Asia (SIM 1 and 2), and South Asia (SIM 1 to SIM 3); while other regions have a positive impact (addition of CO2 emission). Even when using the scenario three, many regions do not have impact of carbon taxes that are marked by zero values in CO2 emissions. From the perspective of Indonesia's commodity side (Table 4) , the biggest reduction of CO2 emissions is coal with the values of -23.65%, -10.96, -2.65%, respectively at SIM 1, 2, and 3. Furthermore, the highest impact of carbon tax is on coal products followed by oil and gas products, respectively; while the lowest impact of carbon tax is on refined oil products (dampak pajak karbon tertinggi adalah pada coal produk yang kemudian diikuti oleh oil and gas products, sedangkan dampak pajak karbon terendah adalah pada refined oil products). Higher carbon tax will reduce CO2 emissions in Indonesia. Table 1 and 2 show that the impact of a carbon tax in Indonesia will reduce GDP of the country itself and may also affect other countries. This study is equivalent to research conducted by Zhou et al. (2011) using GTAP 6 indicating that the use of carbon tax in China will reduce the value of GDP. Similar results are also obtained by Calderón et al. (2016) arguing that CO2 mitigation policy will reduce GDP and the domestic consumption. The decline of GDP is due to the amount of tax paid by producers that will increase the price of commodities. The increase of prices will lead to low purchasing power that will adversely affect the economy. Figure 6 and 7 show the demands of government and private households are against carbon tax policies in Indonesia. It turns out that the negative impact of carbon tax more affects the private household that is indicated by all commodities except crude oil that has decreasing demand from the baseline scenario (no tax). While in the government household, the agriculture sector, crude oil, refined oil product, and other industries have a positive impact. This is caused by the amount of income received by the government will be allocated to agriculture and other sectors as an effort to handle emission reduction. One of the efforts that can be done is the search of new renewable natural resources. It will boost the demand of this sector. A decrease in the demand of private side is also shown by the research of Zhou et al. (2011) .
Discussion
From the environmental side, if the carbon tax in Indonesia is implemented in accordance with the above simulation, then it appears that carbon emissions can reduce emissions of CO2. A carbon tax of 20USD/tCO2 will be able to reduce CO2 emissions by -9.6% meaning that when government policies want to reduce emissions to 29%, higher carbon taxes are required. However, that carbon taxes will also lower demand and GDP should also be noted. Moreover, if viewed from the commodity side, the coal commodity with the use of the carbon tax scenario one is nearing the ideals of Indonesia in the CO2 emissions BAU. The carbon emission decreasing because of carbon tax is also indicated by the research of Calderón 
.
Conclusion
As one of the CO2 mitigation methods, carbon tax can reduce energy use, improve energy efficiency, and simultaneously promote the development of renewable energy. Of course, carbon tax also has its defects. For example, it would slow down the economic growth, decrease social welfares, damage the competitiveness of related industries, and lead to carbon leakage. Therefore, scientific and rational carbon taxation is crucial for countries that implement carbon tax.
Motivated by the controversial issue of real mitigation effect of carbon taxed and CO2 emissions of East Asia and Pacific continents including Indonesia that increase every year (Indonesia is the 15 th largest emitter in the world), the researcher analyzed the impact of GDP, government household demand, private household demand, and CO2 emission reductions in Indonesia if carbon tax is applied in Indonesia under different carbon tax policies by using a dynamic energy environment economy CGE model with GTAP-E.
Both GDP and GDP index have a negative impact due to the carbon tax of US $ 20/tCO2, US $ I0/tCO2, and $ 1.60/tCO2. The greater the application of the carbon tax is, the greater the decrease of the value of GDP.
The demand of governments and private household is against carbon tax policies in Indonesia. It turns out that the negative impact of carbon tax affects private households more that is indicated by all commodities except crude oil that has decreasing demand of baseline scenario (no tax). In the government household, agriculture sector, crude oil, refined oil product, and other industries have a positive impact.
From the environmental side, if the carbon tax in Indonesia is implemented in accordance with the above simulation, then it appears that carbon tax can reduce emissions of CO2.
